Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference

10-12 July 2015

Monash University, Caulfield Campus, Melbourne, Australia

Sponsors

Monash Asia Institute, Monash University

Deakin University

Sophia Journal

Conference Organising Committee

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Purushottama Billimoria, University of Melbourne, Melbourne
Karyn Lai, University of New South Wales, Sydney
Guy Petterson, University of Melbourne, Melbourne
Peter Wong, University of Melbourne, Melbourne
### Friday 10th July

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| 11.00-1.00    | Sean M. Smith
                The Dynamics of the Subliminal Mind in Theravāda
                Buddhism: Two readings of the Bhavanga Citta
                Ven Rangama Chandawimala Thero
                Mindfulness Based Self-reflection: A Model for Self-
                Correction
                Anand Vaidya (with Purushottama Bilimoria)
                The Extended Mind Hypothesis and Advaita Vedānta

| 1.00-2.00     | Lunch                                                         |
| 2.00-3.15     | Jithin Matthew
                Conceptualizing the non-conceptual: Understanding
                Dignāgā’s ‘kalpanāpodān’
                Joshua Stoll
                Ratnakīrti and Casper Hare on Solipsism
                Sydney Morrow
                Metaphysical Personhood in Ancient Chinese
                Philosophy and Karl Jaspers
                Alan Polson
                How should the Chinese ideogram “xin” 心 be
                translated and just what is “shi” 識？ |
| 3.15-3.45     | Afternoon Tea                                                |
| 3.45-5.00     | Ian Nicolay
                Knowing By Imagining
                Koji Tanaka
                Prasanga as Pramana
                Tomoe Nakamura
                Sensory cognition and empathy: the epistemic and the
                ethical scope of “the aesthetic” as explored by
                Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Moto’ori
                Norinaga
                Zhen Huang
                Mou Zongsan’s Kanxian (Negation) and its
                Phenomenological Explanation |
| 5.00-6.30     | Keynote Speech                                               |
|               | Graham Priest (City University of New York)                  |
|               | The Net of Indra                                             |
|               | Respondent                                                   |
|               | Alan Hájek (Australian National University)                  |
|               | ACJC Seminar rooms, Building H, 8th floor (H8.06)            |

### Events

- **Sophia Reception**
  - Pre-Dinner Drinks
  - ACJC Seminar rooms, Building H, 8th floor (H8.06)
### Saturday 11th July

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<td>Chan Lee Virtues and Politics: A Tension of Cultivation between the External and the Internal</td>
<td>Sonam Thakchoe Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: A Case Against Anti-physicalism, Dualism and Monism</td>
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<td>10.20-11.00</td>
<td>Vrinda Dalmiya A Bird-Mother's Grief and Feminist Sources of the Self Room Building H, 8th floor (H8.06)</td>
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<td>Arindam Chakrabarti (University of Hawai’i) Is There a World Out There? God/ No One Knows</td>
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<td>Graham Oppy (Monash University)</td>
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<td>1.00-2.00</td>
<td>Lunch Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Annual General Meeting</td>
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<td>2.00-3.15</td>
<td>Leesa Davis Spiritual cultivation cannot be cultivated: paradox and negation in Ch’an Buddhism</td>
<td>Greg Bailey “Do deeds,” and “Renounce.” Kuru karma tyajeti. Action as an Ontological Category in the Mahābhārata</td>
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<td>Juewei Shi Cultivation in Humanistic Buddhism: applying Chinese Chan principles to contemporary society</td>
<td>Toby Mendelson Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy of Emptiness and Political Liberty: Negative, Positive, Both or Neither?</td>
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<td>Andrew Koh Cultivating Shen 神 in the Huangdi Neijing 黃帝內經</td>
<td>Kazuhiro Watanabe Hume and Buddhism on Moral Agency</td>
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<td>Nicolas Bommarito Training Tigers and Playing Harps</td>
<td>Karsten J. Struhl Buddhist Compassion and Righteous Anger</td>
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<td>5.00-6.30</td>
<td>Max Charlesworth Memorial Lecture (Sponsored by Deakin University) Morny Joy (University of Calgary) From Theories of Action to Activism: Investigating Continuities in the Work of Paul Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt, and Indian Women Thinkers/Activists</td>
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<td>6.30</td>
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Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference  
10-12 July 2015  
Monash University, Caulfield Campus, VIC, Australia

**Sunday 12th July**

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Panel 5: Comparative Philosophy</th>
<th>Panel 6: Cultivation in Indian Philosophy</th>
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| 9.00-11.00 | **Purushottama Bilimoria**  
Frits Staal and Daya Krishna: a tribute and their counter-intuitions for contemporary Indian and Comparative Philosophy | **Bronwyn Finnigan**  
Contemplative Neuroscience and the Problem of Informational Content |
|            | **Michael Levine**  
Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future? | **Padmasiri de Silva**  
The Logic of Somatic Intelligence and Pain Management: Buddhist and Contemporary Western Perspectives |
|            | **Guy Petterson**  
Heidegger’s "Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing" | **Jan Mihal**  
Mind the Shards: Using Trauma and Psychoanalysis to Explore Avidyā’s role in Advaita Vedānta |
| 11.00-11.30| Morning Tea                                                                                       |                                                                                                          |
|            | ACJC Seminar rooms, Building H, 8th floor (H8.06)                                                 |                                                                                                          |
| 11.30-1.00 | **Keynote Speech**  
John Makeham (Australian National University)  
Xiong Shili on Why Reality Cannot be Sought Independent of Phenomena |                                                                                                          |
|            | **Respondent**  
Frank Jackson (Princeton University and Australian National University)  
ACJC Seminar rooms, Building H, 8th floor (H8.06) |
| 1.00-1.45  | Lunch                                                                                             |                                                                                                          |
| 1.45-3.00  | **Alex Bruce**  
Cultivating the "Three Higher Trainings" in Early Christianity & Buddhism | **David McDonell**  
On the Cosmological Significance of Craving in the Second Noble Truth in Theravada Buddhism |
|            | **Elyse Marie Byrnes**  
Love Thyself: The Metaphysics of Love in Arendt and Nishida | **Miri Albahari**  
How should we characterise awakening in Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta? |
| 3.15-3.45  | Afternoon Tea                                                                                      |                                                                                                          |
| 3.30-4.45  | **Benjamin Zenk**  
Disagreement and Haribhadra’s Defense of Non-Absolutism | **Sidha Pandian**  
Dancing upon the Earth: An ontological understanding of Indigenous Performativity |
|            | **Filippo Casati**  
Heidegger and Nishida. The self-grounding nature of Being and Nothingness | **Shaffarullah Abdul Rahman**  
Transformative trajectory in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism: An evaluation of Hick’s transformativeness claim |

- End of Conference -
Keynote Speeches

Graham Priest

The Net of Indra

Huayan, or, as it is called in Japan, Kegon, is one of the most intriguing forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It paints a view of all things as interdependent and interpenetrating. Its most dominant metaphor, alluded to many times in the Huayan (Skr. Avataṃska; Eng. Flower Garland) Sūtra, the key sūtra for this form of Buddhism, is the Net of Indra. In this, reality is likened to an infinite net containing a jewel at every node. Each jewel reflects each other jewel, reflects each jewel reflecting each other jewel, and so on to infinity. In the metaphor, the jewels are the objects of reality. Each encodes all the others. All interpenetrate in the great Dharmadhātu, the totality of all inter-related things. This is a beautiful metaphor. But what, exactly, does it mean? The talk provides an answer. It does so in a perhaps unlikely way: with the help of a little mathematics—graph theory—though, as I will show, this does nothing more that bring out the content of Huayan views and give it a precision it could not otherwise aspire to. (The talk presupposes no mathematical knowledge. The points can be made with some simple diagrams.)

Arindam Chakrabarti

Is There a World Out There? God/ No One Knows

The idea of mind-independent reality, objective truth or recognition-transcendent truth-conditions demands an inconsistent-sounding act of imagination. It sounds like thinking of a world of facts outside of our thinking. But, just as, contra Freud, I can quite consistently imagine the world after my death, without imagining myself as a viewer/thinker inside that world, thinking of a world-minus-thinking need not be as impossible as thinking without thinking. To make the scenario intelligible, sometimes it has been called a “view from nowhere”, although why it must be a ‘view’ at all is not entirely clear. At the end of 20th century, both Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson, advocating, respectively, an anti-realist and a realist theory of meaning, appealed to the idea of an omniscient thinker or interpreter to make sense of this inescapable notion of things as they are in themselves.

Using insights and arguments from classical Indian philosophical debates between theist realist Naiyāyika-s, atheistic anti-realist Buddhists and atheist realist Mīmāṃsakas, this lecture will try to explore the dialectical relationship between the concepts of objectivity and different kinds of omniscience.
Xiong Shili on Why Reality Cannot be Sought Independent of Phenomena

In China, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968) is typically regarded as one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century. The focus of this paper is Xiong’s monistic ontology and draws its findings principally from the 1932 literary edition of his New Treatise on Nothing but Consciousness (Xin weishi lun 新唯識論). Xiong’s New Treatise is the first substantive attempt to respond to the modernist challenge of providing Chinese philosophy with “system”; and he did this in the form of an ontology. The New Treatise consists of an interpretive summary and discussion of key Yogācāra teachings that feature in Cheng weishi lun; a sustained critique of views Xiong attributes to the sixth-century Yogācāra master Dharmapāla; and a synthesis of Yogācāra thought with ideas derived from Madhyamaka Buddhism, various Sinitic traditions of Buddhism, the Book of Change, Laozi and Zhuangzi, and from Chinese Neo-Confucian thinkers associated with the Lu-Wang wing of Neo-Confucian philosophy, as well as Zhu Xi. Xiong was very much a syncretist.

I seek to explain why Xiong insisted that Reality (shìtì 實體; [*tattva]) cannot be sought independent of phenomena despite his also claiming that phenomena are not real. I also show why his project is flawed. The first and major part of the paper introduces Xiong’s critique of Yogācāra accounts of consciousness. The second part introduces his understanding of the doctrine of emptiness. I also trace the connection between Xiong’s understand and how the concept of emptiness was understood in Tathāgatagarbha school of Sinitic Buddhism. I do not address the Confucian elements in his thought—the Buddhist elements are complex enough.

From Theories of Action to Activism: Investigating Continuities in the Work of Paul Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt, and Indian Women Thinkers/Activists

When he first came from France to teach at the University of Chicago in the early 1970’s, Ricoeur was influenced positively by action theory and analytic philosophy, which he incorporated into those aspects of his work that he termed as constituting a semantics and pragmatics of action. He was also influenced by Hannah Arendt and her own particular understanding of action and narrative. In his mature work, Ricoeur incorporated selected elements from both of these positions in a construct of action that was closely connected to homo capax (human capability). This capability, which was central to his passionate commitment to justice, not only featured an activist dimension but also addressed dimensions of impotence. These could involve personal infirmity or other defects that might impede action. Ricoeur was, however, more concerned with instances of injustice, often imposed by external powers, that could interfere with the exercise of one’s capabilities. In this presentation, I intend to compare and contrast distinct aspects of Ricoeur’s activist philosophy with the work of Indian women thinkers and activists, specifically Bina Agarwal, Gayatri C. Spivak, and Chandra Talpade Mohanty.
Papers and Abstracts

Albahari, Miri

How should we characterise awakening in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta?

Awakening – a life-transforming cognitive insight into reality that is supposed to eliminate all mental suffering and bring great joy – is the ultimate goal of both the Buddhist and Advaita Vedanta traditions. Most modern scholars contend that Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta have very different metaphysical commitments – to the point that the reality ‘woken up to’ in one tradition contradicts that of the other. Given the seriousness with which each tradition takes awakening and the path of practice towards it – with their scriptures and long history of widely acclaimed awakened ‘sages’ – a metaphysically contradicting central insight is bad news for the prospect of awakening being a genuine, culture-transcendent capacity. In this paper I challenge the status quo by arguing that the claims about differing metaphysical commitments between early Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta are grossly overinflated. I provide some reason to suppose that the purported central insights had by the most acclaimed proponents within each tradition may well be converging on the same content. If the same content furnishes the cross-traditional central ‘insights’, then this expands the possibility that awakening is a genuine human capacity, which, in turn, has intriguing philosophical implications.

Bailey, Greg

“Do deeds,” and “Renounce.” Kerala karma tyajeti. Action as an Ontological Category in the Mahābhārata

Words for action are legion in Sanskrit, most deriving from the root kr – such as karma, kārya –, car and vṛt. Each of these arguably has different nuances attached to it, but all are used to define a person who functions in the world through activity, activities which have ramifications for agents, including himself/herself, in other worlds. The renunciatory tradition, in theory at least, seeks to have its practitioners largely removing themselves from the world of actions, contradicting what is said in the Bhagavadgītā and other texts that it is ontologically impossible for humans to not act. The inevitability of a person performing actions which have consequences defines them as a specifies different from animals and gods, for example, a definition which gives rise to all kinds of ethical and social considerations.

The question to act or not to act is debated explicitly and implicitly throughout the Mahābhārata, arguably the foundational text of Hinduism. In this paper I examine the cliché phrase kūra karma tyajeti, which occurs four times in different sections of the Mahābhārata, a statement which seems to be a contradiction. In alluding to the Veda it facilitates the discussion of the vexed question of whether one should act or not act. I explore the sense in which the abandonment of actions (karma), both ritual and social, can be argued for coherently when an overwhelming number of passages in the Mahābhārata declare this to be impossible.

Bilimoria, Purushottama

Frits Staal and Daya Krishna: a tribute and their counter-intuitions for contemporary Indian and Comparative Philosophy

The paper revisits the work and perhaps controversial legacies of two recent (sadly, late) thinkers for their insightful challenges and contributions to Indian philosophy as we enter 21st century.

With Frits Staal, I re-examine two of his significant interventions:

1. the meaninglessness of scriptural mantra-s (in the context of the ensuing debate with traditional pandits and his peers in the field, as well as his work on Agnicayana);
s2. a novel formulation of the logic and intricate development of Negation and Dialetheia in classical Indian Philosophy (especially from Grammarians to the Mīmāṃsakas), and the suggestion that when combined with Jaina syādvāda (in the saptabhangī-naya) we have a possible precursor to the Buddhist catuskoti or tetralemma. Various alternative (symbolic) formulations and interpretations, especially of the negative form of the famous tetralemma are considered in response (Robinson, Matilal to Garfield-Priest).

With Daya Krishna, I wish to return to his disquisitions on:

d1. puruṣārtha-s, with the question as to which one of the four (or initially only three?) is the highest kingdom-of-end; whether mokṣa ever featured as one of these, and how coherent is its inclusion in the hierarchized scheme?

d2. what are the methodological contours of samvāda and how might the goal of a critical and 'counter' Indian Philosophy be conceivably achieved? I also examine Daya Krishna’s response to Staal’s thesis on mantra.

d3. Daya Krishna’s calling seriously into question the objectives and ‘pretences’ of Comparative Philosophy (under any other name); in its place he suggested samvāda and svarāj (in K C Bhattacharyya’s sense).

Bommarito, Nicolas

Training Tigers and Playing Harps

The picture of moral development found in Aristotle and defended by contemporary Aristotelians takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue – we become generous by actually giving gifts. Strands in Tibetan thought, however, show how cultivation is possible, and sometimes necessary, without doing the actions associated with the virtues we wish to cultivate. Sometimes this is because the relevant actions are too dangerous for us. The mind training (Tibetan: blo-sbyong) literature likens cultivation to training a tiger – if a beginner starts by actually training a live tiger, she will soon be eaten. In other cases, one can develop a virtue despite being unable to perform the associated actions as when the Tibetan philosopher Tsongkhapa instructs property-less monks on how to develop generosity. These strands in Tibetan thought illuminate the ways in which imagination, not simply action, is essential in moral development.

Bruce, Alex

Cultivating the "Three Higher Trainings" in Early Christianity & Buddhism

Both Christianity and Buddhism propose a teleological dimension to human existence, fulfilled in union with God (theosis) or attaining Nirvana (Theravada) or Enlightenment (Mahayana). However the process involved in achieving these ends involves a radical transformation of body, speech, mind and heart, begun in this lifetime and, at least in Buddhism, continuing over many future incarnations. This transformation involves remarkably similar qualities and spiritual practices in Buddhism and Christianity. Both traditions invite seekers to cultivate ethics, contemplation and wisdom as processes by which one is progressively transfigured on the spiritual journey.

In this presentation, I propose to explore this three-fold scheme of spiritual askesis as its components are developed in the writings of Evagrius Pontus (c345-399) and in the Buddhist Sikkha Sutra in the Anguttara Nikaya of the Pali Canon. For both Evagrius and the Buddha, progress in the spiritual path involves the systematic cultivation of an ethical life as a precondition to contemplation, the mechanism that eventually enables the in-breaking of transcendent wisdom.
Bucci, Alessio / Oda, Takaharu

Izutsu's Understanding of the I-Consciousness in Zen Buddhism: a Metaphysical Critique of CartesianCogito

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism (Izutsu, 1977). This paper aims to critically compare Izutsu's econstruction of Zen metaphysics with the tradition of Western contemporary metaphysics rooted in Descartes 'Cogito Ergo Sum' (Descartes, 1985: 127, 195). After an introduction to Zen Buddhism and a discussion putting Izutsu's terminological choices in context, we reconstruct his argument with the linguistic formula 'I see this' and establish a comparison with the Cartesian Cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on Izutsu's Zen metaphysics from the perspective of Descartes and then vice versa, paying particular attention to the interplay between the two traditions. On the one hand, we focus on a prima facie similarity in meditative and introspective methodologies used by the Zen and Cartesian approaches. On the other, we highlight unequivocal differences in the metaphysical role of the Subject: a mental foundation for the epistemological access to reality (in Descartes), and the point of actualisation of the Universal Mind (in Zen Buddhism). Consequently, in view of the current reception of Descartes in Western analytic metaphysics, we discuss how the Zen ‘I-consciousness’ could be newly fleshed out by developing Izutsu’s intended philosophy from our critical comparison.

Byrnes, Elyse Marie

Love Thyself: The Metaphysics of Love in Arendt and Nishida

In this paper I discuss a classic problem of Christian theology, as explicated by Augustine and later examined by Hannah Arendt. In her dissertation Love and St. Augustine: how is it possible to love a neighbor as oneself if love necessarily entails “self-forgetfulness,” the disintegration of ego-self, eliminating the object and subject of love? This New Testament commandment to “love thy neighbor as thyself” poses a contradiction for Augustine as well as Arendt. I argue that love conceived of as metaphysical movement, rather than an affective state of desire (caritas), not only allows for love of the self as one loves the other, but a simultaneous loving of the self and the other in tandem with the love of the other. Further, I will show that it then becomes—not only possible—but necessary to love the self in order to love the other through such a movement, and vice versa.

In exploring the possibilities and consequences of self-love, I will examine the works of Hannah Arendt and Nishida Kitarō (西田幾多郎), and the Christian Mystical tradition which informed them both (especially Jacob Böehme and Julian of Norwich). I will bring in Nishida’s metaphysics of experience as formulated in his first work Inquiry into the Good (善の研究) as a means of reconciling this contradiction. I will then close with Arendt’s later philosophy to investigate the political implications of such a metaphysics of love.

Casati, Filippo

Heidegger and Nishida. The self-grounding nature of Being and Nothingness

Since Being and Time, Heidegger claims that Being, which makes all objects be, is not an object (a Seienden) and he calls this difference the ontological difference. Recently some people propose that Heidegger uses the ontological difference in order to avoid the infinite regress of grounding (cf. Caputo, 1978, Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought; Braver, 2012, Groundless Ground. A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger). Suppose that every object must be grounded by something (must be made be an object by something) and, furthermore, suppose that a is grounded by b. If b is an object, then it must be grounded by something. Let us call it c. If c is an object, then it must be grounded as well. This chain of grounding will end only if objects are grounded by something which is not an object. According to some interpreters, Being is the groundless ground and it stops the infinite regress.
The aim of this paper is not to examine whether this is Heidegger’s own position or not. Rather, we examine if, given the ontological difference, the conclusion that Being is a groundless ground is metaphysically inevitable. We will propose that this is not the case: Being can be interpreted as a self-grounding ground. To show this, we will compare Heidegger with Kitaro Nishida. First of all, we will briefly review Nishida’s notion of Absolute Nothingness (in particular in his From That Which Acts to That Which Sees) to show that it shares basic metaphysical features with Heidegger’s Being. Secondly, we will show how Nishida endorses a position according to which Absolute Nothingness not only grounds every objects but it also grounds itself. In addition to this, we will address the question whether the self-grounding ground leads to infinite regress or not and, if it is, whether this infinite regress is vicious or not, by considering recent debate about non-well founded grounding (Bliss, 2013, ‘Viciousness and the structure of reality’; 2014, ‘Viciousness and circles of ground’; Priest, 2014, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness).

Dalmiya, Vrinda

A Bird-Mother’s Grief and Feminist Sources of the Self

Feminists who espouse relational selfhood have a hard time promoting the virtue of autonomy. Self-governance (in the minimal sense of non-interference by others) seems incoherent when the self itself is constituted by others. Moreover, the bonds that contribute to the relationality of the self, also make it vulnerable to loss of intimate others and consequently, subject to emotions like uncontrollable grief. My presentation looks at a tragic tale (from the Sanskrit epic, the Mahābhārata) of death, revenge, broken friendship, and grief in the life of a ‘bird-mother’ Analyzing the story against its grain, it argues that vulnerability to emotion can facilitate self-determination. Motherhood in this example, in spite of being intertwined with multiple vulnerabilities, is not a site of self-sacrifice. Rather it opens up the possibility of embodied, relational autonomy.

Davis, Leesa

Spiritual cultivation cannot be cultivated: paradox and negation in Ch’an Buddhism

Chinese Ch’an Buddhism (and later Japanese Zen) is famous for iconoclastic teaching stories that are propelled by the use of paradox and negation. For practitioners, the paradoxical negation of ‘cultivation by non-cultivation’ is not only one of the most puzzling practice instructions, but also potentially one of the most enlightening as it aims to de-reify one of the most ubiquitous attachments in spiritual practice: attachment to the path itself.

Using select paradigmatic teacher-student exchanges this discussion explores the non-dual use of paradox and negation in Ch’an’s “anti-cultivation” teaching strategies and demonstrates how they are underpinned by the fundamental Mahāyāna Buddhist tenets of impermanence (anītya), dependent co-origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and emptiness (śūnyatā). Seen in this light, the Ch’an teacher-student exchanges are dynamic attempts to experientially ignite key philosophical and spiritual understandings and are examples of philosophy in action.

de Silva, Padmasiri

The Logic of Somatic Intelligence and Pain Management: Buddhist and Contemporary Western Perspectives

The publication of the work, The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson and Roch) marked a new paradigm shift in the Western intellectual horizons and generated a new dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist contemplative psychology. But in the contemporary setting,
great strides have been made in somatic learning in the context of pain management. But today, somatic learning is described as the “Art and practice of awakening the natural wisdom of embodied mindfulness”, listening to a “veritable symphony of vibratory messages” of the body. With the development of the neuroplasticity thesis by Richard Davidson, the concept of embodied mindfulness has enriched the concept of somatic learning. Recent studies in mindfulness practices reveal that they can result in profound improvements in a range of physiological, mental, and interpersonal domains of our lives. Cardiac, endocrine and immune functions are improved with mindfulness practice.

After introducing the concept of somatic meditation, this analysis will focus on physical and emotional pain and illustrate the point that Western mindfulness-based psychotherapy and Buddhist contemplative practice are twin paths to emotional healing in pain management. Mindfulness helps to reduce the emotional reactivity of chronic pain. I shall use three icons of mindfulness-based pain management for detailed analysis: Jon Kabat-Zinn the pioneer of the project; the remarkable work of Vidyamala Burch who suffered from chronic back pain for thirty years, using a wheelchair and the co-founder of the breath-works organization; Risa Kaparo who developed a comprehensive program—Awakening Somatic Intelligence—an innovative body-mind approach to transformative healing and renewal, has a genius for both the body and its language and offers the nurturing guidance of a therapist for pain management.

Finnigan, Bronwyn

Contemplative Neuroscience and the Problem of Informational Content

Contemplative neuroscience is an emerging multidisciplinary field that investigates whether Buddhist practices of mindfulness meditation can generate emotional and psychological well-being. This paper will address recent challenges from contemporary Buddhist philosophers and scholars. I will organise these challenges into easy and hard problems and will argue that the field of cognitive neuroscience faces a particularly hard problem. I call this the problem of informational content. I will identify and motivate this problem. I will argue against the suggestion that it undermines the very enterprise of contemplative neuroscience but will show the inadequacy of at least two possible ways of resolving it using current neuroscientific models.

Gibbons, Chris

‘Vedic’ Allusion in Epic Narratives: Śuka’s ‘Yoga’ in Mbh 12.309-320

Eminent Vedic scholar Michael Witzel (1997: 506) speaks of his “considered opinion, that the way things are formulated in the Epics and Purāṇas are a ‘secondary elaboration’ of a Vedic (and, often, still earlier) set of concepts.” (italics in original). Whilst I am increasingly persuaded by the methodological necessity of keeping the Vedic background in clear view when considering the Mahābhārata (Mbh) in particular, explaining more precisely the “secondary” character of such an elaboration remains a more elusive and challenging problem.

In this paper I will consider this problem in light of how the epic poets handle the concepts associated with the word yoga in the fascinating and mysterious narration of the birth, coming of age, and liberation (mokṣa) of Śuka—the oldest son of Vyāsa, the epic’s eponymous “author in the works”—in the Mokṣadharmaparvan, 12.309-20. In line with the conference theme, I will focus particularly on the question of mind and the psychosomatic methods (yoga) Śuka deploys in his quest for mokṣa over the course of the narrative. I will argue that the epic poets use the narrative medium as a device for melding essentially ‘classical’ (i.e. post-Vedic) values and ideas associated with the words, yoga and mokṣa—as the liberation achieved through merging the constituent elements of ‘mind’ (in the most general sense) back into the cosmogonic source (brahman, puruṣa)—with concepts discernable already in the earlier śruti i.e. in the ritual liturgies (sūkta, mantra, stotra etc.) and concomitant prose exegeses.
(brāhmaṇa) and, of course, in the Upaniṣads. I will also argue that the model of 'Vedic' elaboration that Śuka’s narrative presents, demonstrates in striking fashion how the epic poets “explore the narrative possibilities of fiction” 2 when adapting to their classical vision, images and ideals of an (often much) older provenance. I will conclude by proposing that, as a “secondary elaboration” of an older set of concepts through the narrative medium, the Mbh (as exemplified in Śuka’s story), far from being a straightforward restatement of a Vedic set of concepts remains thoroughly novel and early classical in character.

1 Hildebeitel

**Ho, Chien-hsing**

**Resolving the Ineffability Paradox**

A number of contemporary philosophers think that the unqualified statement “X is unspeakable” faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this statement is true, it must at the same time be false, given that X is speakable by the predicate word “unspeakable.” This predicament is in this paper formulated as an argument that I term the “ineffability paradox.” To cope with this paradox, I first examine the Buddhist semantic theory of apoha (exclusion) and an apoha solution to the issue. Then, I attend to a few passages in the works of the two Chinese Madhyamika philosophers, Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?–414) and Jizang (吉藏, 549–623), and of the fifth-century Hindu grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari to rationally reconstruct a strategy for resolving the paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed “indication,” together with the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I attempt to show that expressing the ineffable does not necessarily involve irresolvable contradiction. It is also suggested that philosophers may need to acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ineffability for contemporary philosophizing.

**Zhen Huang**

**Mou Zongsan’s Kanxian (Negation) and its Phenomenological Explanation**

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, also spelled Mou Tsung-san) is a representative of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Consulting Kant and Wang Yangming (王阳明), Mou built his own structure of Chinese philosophy. One of Mou’s important concepts is *kanxian* (坎陷, to sink in or sunk in), in his early works which means using one’s mind to identify or differentiate or understand experiences or observations rather than letting one’s intuition gain creativity or absolute truth. In Mou’s later work, he discussed *kanxian* of innate knowledge (良知) without giving *kanxian*’s exact meaning. On the other side, a Swiss phenomenologist, Iso Kern, uses phenomenological method to study Wang Yangming and his students. Kern regards innate knowledge as moral consciousness. In a sense, *kanxian* of innate knowledge could be considered as intentionality of moral consciousness. In this way, Mou’s philosophy could be explained by methods of phenomenology.

**Koh, Andrew**

**Cultivating Shen 神 in the Huangdi Neijing 黃帝內經**

The theoretical basis for the practice of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) can be traced to the *Huangdi Neijing* 黃帝內經, a text that contains ideas from as early as the 3rd century BCE and to which accretions and commentaries have been added over the centuries, right up to the Tang dynasty. The *Neijing* consists of two books, namely, the *suwen* 素問 and the *lingshu* 灵樞. In both books, it is stated strongly that *shen* 神 is of primary importance. The *suwen* chapter 13 states that so long as *shen* remains, even if the theory of acupuncture is lost, the physician is still able to treat effectively. On the other hand, if *shen* is lost, not only is the disease incurable
but a whole nation can be subjugated (*suwen* 26). While *shen* does take on a few meanings of which ‘spirit’, ‘mind’ and ‘cognition’ appear to be among them, the *Neijing* itself offers a few explanations of the concept of *shen* and points to the way in which *shen* can and ought to be cultivated. In doing so, the continuum between what we would now call medicine (strategies to heal/cure illnesses/diseases) and health maintenance is brought to the fore and emphasised. This paper explores what a physician does to act on and cultivate *shen* both within him/herself and the patient according to the *Neijing*.

**Lee, Chan**

**Virtues and Politics: A Tension of Cultivation between the External and the Internal**

Why do we make cultivation of virtues? According to Aristotle, we should do it for our ∗φροντὶς·. Although everybody might have a different answer of what it really is, Confucian thinkers always consider it in the socio-political milieu of how to make the world peace. No matter of how we accomplish a perfect virtue, it would be meaningless unless it plays certain roles in making a community better. In other words, will not come alone. Thus, a matter of cultivation cannot be confined to personal dimension.

Such a Confucian stance tackles the inwardness of cultivation, which can be regarded as something subjective. To cultivate virtues is not just to be a certain better person with inner integrity, but also to do good things with an iron will. In this vein, Confucians try to establish certain criteria with which most people could agree by keeping the balance between the internal values and the external norms. This is exactly what Aristotle means by ∗φροντὶς·. I think that this is one of arguments against objection that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles. For example, the inner values can be objectively justified via the consensus of community. If we accept the point that a personal virtue can soak into many of us, it implies certain dynamics of human relationship, which can be called politics in micro level. I think cultivation play crucial roles in making relationship with others politically. Finally, cultivation is the political as well as the moral.

**Levine, Michael**

**Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?**

Fission involves large radioactive nuclei which break down in to two smaller ones ... giving off energy in the process.

Fusion involves two smaller nuclei which under extreme temperature and pressures bond together to form a larger atom and also give off energy in the process... One of the most appealing characteristics of fusion as opposed to fission is that it is much cleaner

i. Introductions

Although the two have met, “fusion philosophy” has yet to be properly introduced to comparative philosophy. There are those on both sides of the divide, and some are on both sides of the divide, that will deny that fusion philosophy and comparative philosophy are engaged in the same sort of enterprise, or are in competition. They have not thought the matter through. While it is largely true that they are not doing the same sorts of things (e.g. analyzing the same issues), it is not the case that their different approaches, self-conceptions, and understandings of some of the same subject matter and source material, means that they are not competing with one another. Comparative philosophy should find itself deeply at odds with the approach to various philosophical problems and traditions that fusion philosophy is taking, and comparative philosophers will surely deny Siderits’ (2003: xi) claim that they have been superseded. The fusion challenge may help comparativists to further clarify the methodological and theoretical doubts that have informed comparative philosophy from the start.
What Siderits calls fusion philosophy arguably has a number of aliases. Thus, although Bo Mou would emphatically deny this, what he (Bo Mou) calls the “constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy” or CECP for short, is at times sufficiently similar to fusion philosophy to warrant the same appellation. Indeed, several of the editorial advisers to the journal Comparative Philosophy, edited by Bo Mou, are prime examples of those doing just what it is that Siderits calls fusion philosophy. The question then is whether fusion philosophy has superseded comparative philosophy in the way Siderits claims it has; or is it instead, a newer and more sophisticated or useful version of comparative philosophy; perhaps a version that CECP at times incorporates (or vice-versa)?

Bo Mou never uses the term or refers to “fusion philosophy” in the introductory essay that lays out the “theme” of Comparative Philosophy, and it is unclear from that essay whether he knows it exists. It is clear that, in principle at least, he would see CECP, as distinct from fusion philosophy, and see CECP as the genuine and latest incarnation of comparative philosophy. In any case Siderits, sees an established trend towards fusion philosophy, while Bo Mou sees a trend towards CECP. Who is right? Siderits is right with regard to Western analytic philosophers. CECP may however better characterize what many other comparativists are doing.

The alleged differences between fusion philosophy and CECP may be summarized as follows. (1) FP is largely unconcerned with methodological issues while CECP attends to such issues -- even more than traditional comparative philosophy; (2) FP generally denies the historical approach while CECP does not. CECP considers the philosophical-issue-concerned approach and the historical approach as complementary and as sensitive to distinct purposes and focuses. It emphasizes philosophical interpretation of the classical texts; (3) FP focuses largely on analytic treatment; in contrast, the CECP emphasizes the constructive engagement between distinct approaches from different traditions; (4) FP has been largely focused on Buddhism. In contrast, the CECP’s coverage is far more comprehensive. It is a way of doing philosophy.

Matthew, Jithin
Conceptualizing the non-conceptual: Understanding Dignāgā’s ‘kalpanāpodam’

Dignāgā, as he lays the foundation of his epistemic edifice in Pramāṇasamuccaya, comes up with the definition of perception as pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham. This exegesis intrigued an investigation in to the nature of perceptual content. The paper attempts to look in to the various possibilities of non-conceptual content by juxtaposing it with the rest of epistemic contents of Dignāgā. The paper resorts to Dharmakīrti’s commentary for a better contrast. The debates on non-conceptual content in the western epistemic and cognitive paradigms, mostly Robert Hanna, Austin Clark, and Christopher Peacocke are also looked in to in order to form a comprehensive view point of the non-conceptual content in perception. The doctrine of Apoha advocated by Dignāgā is used as an epistemic filter to narrow down the various layouts.

McDonell, David
On the Cosmological Significance of Craving in the Second Noble Truth in Theravada Buddhism

While it is appropriate to interpret the Second Noble Truth, that craving is the origin of suffering, to have cosmological significance beyond its more obvious psychological application, the strong cosmological interpretation encourages us to understand craving not only in terms of being the origin of suffering (dukkha), but also as the engine of creation itself. This view is expressed by Morrison, in his analysis of the Aggaṇṇa Sutta; Bodhi, in his commentary on the Kukkuravatika Sutta; and Gethin, in his analysis of the three-fold division of the spheres. Such interpretations are not, as such, uncommon; but are, I will argue, mistaken.
In this paper I outline 4 interrelated arguments for the cosmological interpretation, which for convenience I refer to as: (i) the argument from creation, (ii) the argument from Buddhist cosmological hierarchy, (iii) the argument from dependent origination, and (iv) the argument from samsaric release. I suggest that the motivation for over-interpretating the Second Noble Truth arises firstly, from an understandable but inaccurate interpretation of the doctrine of dependent origination; and, secondly, an over-extension of the notion of samsara such that it comes to imply the notion of the cosmos itself. That is, in not satisfactorily distinguishing between kammic and non-kammic dependent origination, we are led to mis-interpret the Second Noble Truth as implying that craving gives rise not to merely one’s own subjective conditions, but to the conditions of the world itself; and, in overextending the concept of craving, such that it is (mis)identified with the conditions of samsara itself, and samsara with the cosmos itself, what ought to be taken as a description of the nature of experience, is taken as a description of the nature of existence per se.

I finish by pointing out that my position should not be taken to imply support for a materialist reductive account of the relation between craving, samsara and the world. Rather, I argue for a weak cosmological interpretation whereby craving ought to be understood to have some cosmological significance, in so far as it is kammically potent; but, that this does not warrant viewing as some sort of ‘engine of creation itself’.

McGinty, Daniel

Is there an equivalent of First Philosophy in the early Chinese philosophical tradition?

The concept of a fundamental mode of philosophical inquiry has appeared all throughout the history of the Western philosophical tradition - normally designated as ‘First Philosophy’ - and aims to address the most fundamental questions whose answers are consequential to all other fields. As a result, it has often been positioned at the root of a hierarchical structure categorizing the relationship between different fields of inquiry. It has often also been associated with metaphysics, though dissenting conceptions from philosophers like Husserl and Levinas suggest that it is possible for other forms of inquiry to form such a foundation as well. The purpose of this paper is to examine several models of First Philosophy in the Western tradition (including the Aristotelian, Baconian, Cartesian, Wolffian, Husserlian and others) and attempt to formulate a generalized conception of First Philosophy as a fundamental, self-grounded, foundational and universal field of inquiry – one that need not be associated with metaphysics by necessity. The paper will then discuss the prospect of investigating whether the early Chinese philosophical tradition similarly presupposes a fundamental root upon which its core philosophical concerns are grounded – a field that meets our generalized definition. Finally, the paper will suggest a preliminary candidate for ‘Chinese first philosophy’ by arguing that the core philosophical concerns found in the classical Chinese texts may actually presuppose a fundamental concern with lived human experience as foundational – one that bears an affinity with that discussed in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty – rather than a foundational metaphysics.

Mendelson, Toby

Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy of Emptiness and Political Liberty: Negative, Positive, Both or Neither?

It is unambiguous that Nāgārjuna’s philosophical work on emptiness is aimed at the soteriological goal of mokṣa. To what extent is this commensurable with contemporary conceptions of political freedom? Might such a comparative move be an unacceptable ‘western’ imputation? Or are there important resonances with particular forms of political freedom which warrant closer examination? I will explore these tensions through an analysis of emptiness and the categories of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ political freedom as described in Isaiah Berlin’s classic 20th century essay Two Conceptions of Liberty. My intention is to draw out the
implications both for a politically informed Buddhism and for the sake of a potential political philosophy which takes seriously some of the great ideas of ancient India.

Mihal, Jan

Mind the Shards: Using Trauma and Psychoanalysis to Explore Avidyā's role in Advaita Vedānta

In the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, the true self (Ātman) is held to be undifferentiated infinite consciousness (Brahman). The individual everyday mind (jīva), of which there are obviously many, is taken to be an illusion caused by ignorance (avidyā). This worldview raises a number of issues, among them: a) How can ignorance be a cause of illusion rather than an effect of it? And, b) How does one consciousness become many minds? This paper offers some ideas from Western psychology, specifically the study of trauma and repression in Psychoanalytic schools, as useful analogies and heuristic tools in responding to these issues. Rather than acting as irrefutable arguments, the analogies I introduce elucidate and motivate the Advaitan position, in the vein of classical examples, such as the rope-snake analogy.

Conditions such as dissociative identity disorder (formerly known as multiple personality disorder) are real-world cases of unintegrated and repressed traumatic events causing a single personality to split into multiple, roughly showing how avidyā might cause the illusion of multiple minds. I will also explore other resemblances and structural similarities, such as those between repression and avidyā, recurring flashbacks and samsāra, and the Freudian idea of projection and adhyāsa (superimposition) as analysed by Śaṅkara. These similarities will be drawn out alongside an acknowledgement of the limitations of comparing the two systems, avoiding a superficial combination of two cultures separated by much time and space; rather, the goal is to offer new analogies to motivate the Advaitan analysis of mind and self.

Morrow, Sydney

Metaphysical Personhood in Ancient Chinese Philosophy and Karl Jaspers

In this paper, I focus on the qiongda yishi (窮達以時) “Failure and Success is a Matter of Timing,” a Warring States Era manuscript discovered in the first Guodian (郭店) tomb. In a cosmology wherein the vicissitudes of dao manifest in auspicious and inauspicious settings for human possibilities, culpability for failure does not rest solely in human action. Yet, this text indicates that there are those for whom inauspicious conditions do not preclude success. By continuing to cultivate themselves even in the face of hardship, these junzi (君子) eventually achieved great success as personal advisors to the Kings and Dukes of their respective times. I argue that these individuals achieved a metaphysical perspective of their place in the cosmos which allowed them to transcend the limits which threatened their success.

I will bring in Karl Jaspers’ concept of Existenz as a way of understanding this metaphysical perspective. At the limit of what can be thought from within one’s own perspective, the human activity of philosophizing begins as a transcending movement toward a wholeness of worldview and a fertile ground for understanding and communication. This temporary and evanescent view is yet a part of the grounded and ultimately physical human perspective. Philosophizing embraces the uncertainty and indirectness of the realities which mold the human project. Achieving a metaphysical perspective creates new possibilities for assessing situations, which invokes the creativity necessary for a cultivated life. By refusing to posit a certain future, the junzi freed themselves from the absoluteness of their cosmic allotment. Hence, cultivation in this sense does not promote a certain goal, but the lack of one.
Nakamura, Tomoe

**Sensory cognition and empathy: the epistemic and the ethical scope of “the aesthetic” as explored by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Moto’ori Norinaga**

Baumgarten’s establishment of modern European aesthetics as a science of sensory cognition in 1750 was tied up with an attempt to re-evaluate the epistemic and the ethical value of *aisthesis* (sensory perception). This paper first clarifies the metaphysical grounds on which such value was vindicated by Baumgarten. I will argue that he developed a reconciliatory attitude toward the traditional dualism between “the intellectual” and “the sensory” and provided a concept of the self as the aesthetic subject. This paper in turn contrasts this metaphysical structure with Japanese philosophical discourses. This is done through an analysis of Norinaga’s idea of empathy, which was thought to be evoked by awareness of “mono no aware” (the pathos of things). His evaluation of empathy provides a different way to consider the epistemic and the ethical value of sensory perception. Furthermore it also offers another potential to acknowledge the subjectivity of sensory experience. Through a comparison between Baumgarten and Norinaga, this paper seeks to illuminate the point that the recognition of their differences or affinities may offer a potential to enrich the valuation of sensory experience from a viewpoint of both epistemological- and ethico-aesthetics.

Nicolay, Ian

**Knowing By Imagining**

Two related questions lead us by distinct streets to the intersection of epistemology and imagination: First, *How can we know about possibilities (if at all)?* Second, *What (if anything) can we know only by means of imagination?* The connection between these two questions will gradually become clearer. For the moment, it suffices to say regarding the first question that *since* we think about, infer from, refer to, and act upon beliefs in *perceived possibilities*, it is valuable to know their epistemic status—that is, whether and how they can be known.

Taking up the latter question, we should first note that it is distinct from the (misguided) question: “What can we know by means of imagination alone?” The former question seeks instances where imagination is necessary for knowledge; the latter, instances where imagination is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge. If there is any sort of knowledge for which imagination is a necessary condition, then imagination is an epistemic instrument—an instrumental means of knowledge.

Classical Indian Epistemology offers an approach to these questions via Pramāṇa theory. The basic insight of pramāṇa epistemology is that any instance of knowledge shares a common fundamental structure: *Knowers-*means of knowing-known (or, in Sanskrit terms, *pramāṇa-pramāṇa—prameya.*) An ascription of knowledge lacking one of these features invites the questions:

“Whose knowledge?” “Knowledge how or by what means?” “Knowledge of what?” respectively. A classical debate in pramāṇa epistemology has asked, “what can be a valid means of knowledge?” Candidates have included sense-perception, inference, testimony, and comparison, among others—each of which allow a characteristic sort of knowledge. Imagining has never been a candidate for pramāṇa status, nor am I suggesting that it should have been—but only that the notion of an epistemic instrument capable of accessing a characteristic sort of knowledge is useful when considering the epistemic status of imagining. So to test the hypothesis that imagination is a reliable epistemic instrument, we can ask, Are there any characteristically imaginative varieties of knowledge? Can anything be or become known only with the aid of imagining?

This paper conjectures that non-trivial, action-guiding modal knowledge is a strong candidate for a characteristically imaginative variety of knowledge (one which can be known only by recourse to imagination), and subsequently develops—relying upon the resources of
contemporary analytic as well classical Nyāya epistemology and philosophy of mind—an account of the sort of imaginative activity that can afford us access to this characteristically imaginative variety of knowledge.

Pandian, Sidha

Dancing upon the Earth: An ontological understanding of Indigenous Performativity

Central to my PhD thesis, are a series of performative dialogues between Indigenous Australian and Indian classical dance perspectives. Drawing on these valuable artistic encounters, this presentation will highlight the shifts that have occurred within my own performative consciousness and how these dialogues of innovative exchange and collaboration have shed light on the deeper ontological praxis of Indigenous performativity that navigate the complex ideas related to dancing upon the Earth.

Petterson, Guy

Heidegger's "Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing"

Often Heidegger has been drawn into the exercise of comparative philosophy contrasting Asian and Western philosophers and philosophies. When this happens Heidegger the philosopher becomes the topic of comparison, construed now as one of a binary pair of objects to be compared, contrasted and criticised. Less often have Heidegger's own thoughts on comparative philosophy been given ample consideration. In an incomplete, partly presented lecture course for the 1944-1945 winter semester (only recently published in German and even more recently translated into English) Heidegger continues his interest in exploring new ground in philosophy outside the traditional conceptions of metaphysics and logic. In this partial work Heidegger adds some insightful contributions to the question of what is involved in the exercise of comparing. He asks what is actually involved in true engagement with the thinking of a thinker. A notable feature of Heidegger's approach to comparative philosophy is that he always addresses philosophy itself and its relation to the human essence.

Polson, Alan

How should the Chinese ideogram “xin” 心 be translated and just what is “shi” 识?

This paper looks at how the term “xin”, heart, is usually translated in scholarly articles as “heart mind”. I affirm that “xin”, heart, in the Chinese context is not “heart mind”, but rather “heart consciousness”. In Buddhist articles and translations “shi” 识 is usually translated as “consciousness” and I consider this is an incorrect rendering. I will argue for a new translation based on dictionary reference, Buddhist sutra and abhidharma reference, as well as biological embryo development, Western philosophy and psychology.

Rahman, Shaffarullah Abdul

Transformative trajectory in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism: An evaluation of Hick’s transformativeness claim

Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is almost exclusively debated in the literature in terms of his view that the Kantian postulation of the phenomenal/noumenal Real can best explain the plurality of the home ultimates. While the fixation on this particular aspect of Hick’s pluralistic thought is understandable, Hick’s other pluralistic contention that the transformation of the self is the salvific achievement under the pluralistic hypothesis is virtually ignored or not discussed in its own merit. This paper fills the gap in the current literature on Hick by critically evaluating
what I call the transformativeness claim. The core idea behind the transformativeness claim is that, for Hick, the salvific achievement in a religiously diverse world under the pluralistic hypothesis is to be defined as a transformative change from self-centredness to Reality-centredness (1995 pp. 43-44, 2004 pp. 36-55).

In this paper I argue that if the transformations in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are from the default state of self-centredness to the salvific state of Reality-centredness, tracking how the transformative trajectory actually works in different religions reveals a different picture of transformativeness, at least not the way that Hick has acknowledged. While Hinduism and Buddhism seem to strongly corroborate the transformativeness claim in the sense that the samsaric state is the default state and the enlightened states of Moksha and Nirvana is the achievement of the transformed state, there is a good reason to believe that Judaism, Christianity and Islam do not have the same sense of transformative trajectory. In the case of Judaism I survey how transformation may work in favour of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis but it seems that while the doctrines of Olam-haba (the world to come), mashiach (messiah) and Tsadik (the saint) may be marked by a different degree of transformativeness, it is not indicative of transforming the self from one different state to another different state but rather it is the transformation of humanity as the whole as in the case of Olam-haba and mashiach or it is not an individual goal of the Hasidic Jews as in the case of the concept of Tsadik. While I agree with Hick that the sinful state sufficiently corresponds to the self-centred state in the case of Christianity, the transformed state to which it is changing in this life is not permanently transformative for achieving because humans are inclined to fall back to the precursor state of sinfulness. Although it is not clear what self-centredness in the case of Islam amounts to under the pluralistic hypothesis, I point out that there seems to be no state which is sufficiently self-centred because the Islamic concept of fitra (the default state of nature) is not precisely self-centred in Hickian sense and even if we consider the concept of nafs (the self, ego or desire) as a possible candidate for self-centredness, it does not seem to have the same default meaning of self-centredness.

Shi, Juweii
Cultivation in Humanistic Buddhism: applying Chinese Chan principles to contemporary society

The start of Chan practice that carries a distinctive Chinese flavour is often credited to Huineng (638 – 713). This paper commences with the rejection, by Huineng, of sitting meditation without active understanding of intrinsic nature. Huineng’s disciple, Shenhuí (670 – 762), popularised the method of sudden awakening which directly appealed to the mind, or nature, of mankind. Yixuan (? – 866) then founded the Linji School, which recognised intellectual emancipation as its real mission. Such innovative methods were employed to help individuals discover reality through their own efforts and life experiences and, as this paper will reveal, through active reformation, eighth century Buddhism in China saw the creation of Chinese Chan. The Humanistic Buddhism promoted by Hsingyun (b. 1927), a descendent of the Linji school, is a modern day revival of ancient Chinese Buddhism. In addition to rituals and sitting meditation, Hsingyun also advocates a form of living Chan, to be practised in daily activities.

This paper will review Hsingyun’s promotion of the Buddha’s teachings on happiness, virtues, purity and enlightenment, in light of the Chinese Chan tradition of progressively bringing Buddhism closer to the people. In this way, cultivation becomes practical for most people.

Smith, Sean M.
The Dynamics of the Subliminal Mind in Theravāda Buddhism: Two readings of the Bhavanga Citta

That there are latent mental process beneath the surface of the ordinary functions of the sensory-cognitive mind is an important idea embedded in the sutta-pitaka of early Indian
Buddhism. However, this idea is never fully explicated there. In subsequent Theravāda abhidhamma, the bhavanga citta is posited to correct for this; a subliminal mental event that functions to sustain the causal continuity of the stream of consciousness when more ordinary sensory-cognitive functions become latent, especially during non-ordinary states of mind cultivated through meditative contemplation. Yogācāra philosophers also posited an expanded schema of consciousness to address the issue of latent dispositions.

Both views suffer from difficulties. Specifically, the bhavanga citta only arises when other sensory and cognitive functions cease. Thus, it provides only diachronic continuity but not synchronic unity to the affective depths of the mind. By contrast, subsequent Indian philosophers, both Buddhist and otherwise, rightly criticize the Yogācāra’s notion of ālavaṇīṇāna on the grounds that it slips into a reified subliminal self. In this paper I will explore the Burmese scholar monk Ledi Savadaw’s unique interpretation of bhavanga citta. I argue that his analysis thereof represents a philosophically sophisticated and phenomenologically plausible middle path between the two aforementioned views.

Stoll, Joshua

Ratnakīrti and Casper Hare on Solipsism

Descartes once remarked that we don’t see that others exist, since what we see are just “hats and coats which could conceal automatons.” This is a quintessential statement of the cognitivist tendency to think of minds as inherently first person entities. Such a conception of mentality threatens solipsism, and so inferential validity has been sought to certify our apparent knowledge that others exist. But just what might solipsism imply? To explore this question Ratnakīrti’s dū ana of Dharmakīrti’s siddhi on santānāntara will be examined. This will be compared to the much more contemporary defense of solipsism coming from Casper Hare. It will be suggested, first, that Ratnakīrti’s refutation of ‘other’ santāna amounts to a corollary of the standard Buddhist conception of anātman: to be a nāirātmyavādin implies a certain conceptual solipsism. Secondly, epistemic solipsism, as defended by Hare, will be shown to require a defense of conceptual solipsism. Finally, it will be suggested that conceptual solipsism is incoherent so long as it isn’t accompanied by an admission of the incoherence of an inherently first person entity.

Struhl, Karsten J.

Buddhist Compassion and Righteous Anger

It is generally taken as axiomatic that Buddhism sees anger as a thoroughly destructive emotion that needs to be extinguished. Buddhist practice has as its intention to extinguish the illusion of the self and cultivate compassion for all living beings, whereas anger is generally regarded as reinforcing the idea of a separate self and an emotion which prevents compassion from arising. Furthermore, anger is sometimes a translation of “dosa” which, for Buddhism, is one of the three poisons (the other two being greed and delusion). While “dosa” is perhaps more often translated as “ill will” or “hatred,” it is still assumed that anger is always a manifestation of hatred and tends to increase hatred. Finally, in the Dhammapada, anger (“kodha”) is unambiguously described as a destructive and negative emotion which must be “conquered by love” and held in check.

In my paper, I shall question these assumptions, specifically in regard to what is sometimes referred to as “righteous anger,” by which I mean anger against injustice, and I want to question them within the context of engaged Buddhism. I shall argue that righteous anger has within it the seeds of insight and an energy which can be harnessed by compassion – what has been called “fierce” or “confrontational” compassion – to challenge systems of injustice. To make this argument I shall consider Aristotle’s analysis of the “good-tempered” man who is angry at the right thing and not led by vengeful passion, the use of wrathful energy to confront oppressive social structures in behalf of everyone, the difference between productive and
reactive anger, and the possibility of a selfless anger guided by compassion. I shall, however, also make clear that the development of fierce compassion needs to reorganize and transform the energy of anger so that it can be subordinated to compassion.

**Tanaka, Koji**

**Prasanga as Pramana**

Gilbert Harman (1986) argues that logic as a science of consequence relations ('proof or argument') is not the same thing as reasoning in the sense of a procedure for 'reasoned change in view'. He holds that logic does not tell us how to rationally change our views (or beliefs). Hartry Field (2009) takes Harman as holding the view that logic has no normative role in reasoning and argues against this view.

We can find similar debates between Bhaviveka (6th C.E.) (and his Svantrika followers) and Dharmakirti (7th C.E.) on the one hand and Candrakirti (7th C.E.) on the other regarding the nature of prasanga (reductio ad absurdum). Candrakirti seems to take prasanga as concerned only with internal consistency within one's beliefs. When a belief is shown to be inconsistent with other beliefs, prasanga may disclose inconsistency but it does not tell us how the beliefs should be changed.

Given that Candrakirti does not officially endorse any other logical machinery, he holds a view similar to that of Harman. Bhaviveka and Dharmakirti argue against Candrakirti by claiming that prasanga as a logical apparatus is a pramana (valid means of cognition) and thus normative. Their arguments are different from each other; importantly, they are very different from the one given by Field. By critically analysing and supporting the position of Bhaviveka and in particular Dharmakirti, I will explain what it means for logic to be normative and argue that logic has a significant normative role in reasoning against Harman and Candrakirti.

**Thakchoe, Sonam**

**Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: A Case Against Anti-physicalism, Dualism and Monism**

Many philosophers have recently argued that Buddhist philosophy of mind is reductionist and is decidedly anti-physicalist as it holds either mind-only monism or some forms of dualism. My paper challenges this conclusion.

**Thero, Ven Rangama Chandawimala**

**Mindfulness Based Self-reflection: A Model for Self-Correction**

The human mind is the most beautiful and striking phenomenon in this world. There is nothing which affects human life than mind. Buddhism teaches that mind is the forerunner of all physical, verbal, and mental activities. It is the chief of life, the initiator of thoughts, and it moves the life forward. Yet it is a conditional phenomenon which constantly oscillates between negative and positive mental traits. Mind is luminous but it is defiled due to adventitious defilements. It is undeveloped by its nature and therefore it requires much training for the benefit of oneself and others. Mental traits are not fixed; hence, they can be changed and transformed through practice of mindfulness. Based on the teachings of Sutta Pitaka, in this paper, I will suggest a model for self-correction, which comprising three steps: knowing one’s mind, thoughtfulness and the practice of 'self-reflexion'. First, this paper will present a detailed account of mind and its nature because understanding the mind is an essential fact in this process. Second, consequences of a corrupted mind will be discussed. Third, the Buddhist teaching of self-reflexion (the Mirror of the Dhamma), will be introduced as an effective method to correct oneself. Fourth, the benefits of the awareness of daily life will be explained.
followed by the conclusion. However, the Buddhist practice of meditation won't be covered here.

Vaidya, Anand (with Purushottama Bilimoria)

The Extended Mind Hypothesis and Advaita Vedānta

The extended mind hypothesis, EMH, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), maintains that in some cases the mind extends beyond the body. In this work we do not primarily engage the question of whether EMH is true. Rather, we engage the comparative philosophical question: Do any of the schools of classical Indian philosophy articulate and defend the view that the mind extends beyond the body in a style of constructive engagement that pushes forward the debate on EMH? Using Mark Rowland’s (2010) discussion of EMH and Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher’s (2012) defense of EMH, we build a framework for critically investigating our question. The framework we build uses Adams and Maher’s analysis of John Haugeland’s (1995) argument in favor of EMH, as well as their analysis of the problem with Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa’s (2001, 2010) objection that EMH commits the coupling-constitution fallacy. We maintain, in agreement with Adams and Maher, that there are two reasonable, though not decisive, conditions on when mind extension occurs. The system condition maintains that mind extension occurs in the case of a specific mental state type on a given occasion when the subject forms a genuine system involving an entity external to the body. The responsibility condition maintains that the relevant kind of system for mind extension is in place when the subject in the system takes responsibility for the activity of the system as a whole. Based on these conditions and the work of Purushottama Bilimoria (1980, 1985, 1988) on pratyakṣa, jñāna, pramāṇa, and pramāṇa in Advaita Vedānta we argue that:

(i) The Advaita Vedānta School does present an account of perception that satisfies the system condition, however it fails to satisfy Adams and Maher’s responsibility condition.

(ii) Because of the differences between belief and perception and classical Indian pramāṇa debates (debates over the nature of valid cognition) and contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology, there is an alternative account of the responsibility condition, responsibility* which Advaita Vedānta does articulate. Their own account of perception satisfies responsibility*. And

We close with a comparative discussion of the significance of this ontological point for the purposes of a cross-cultural constructive engagement, which we believe enhances a comprehensive understanding of the extended mind hypothesis.

Watanabe, Kazuhiro

Hume and Buddhism on Moral Agency

Although a large number of studies have been made on a parallelism between Humean and Buddhist conceptions of Self, by and large they have debated only negative or distractive part of their views or so-called No-Self theories. Whether or not an affinity between Humean and Buddhist views on Self is genuine, we are left with some lingering questions such as "If there is no Self, how can we be responsible for our act?" Interestingly, however, in these couple of decades there has been an emerging interest in the positive or constructive part of Hume’s view on Self, in which he expounds on 'self with regard to passions'. Also, we now have an increasing body of works in Buddhist ethics from analytical perspectives. In this paper, by utilizing those efforts made both in Hume studies and Buddhist ethics which try to understand how our self, self-conception and moral responsibility are related, I try to extend Humean-
Buddhist comparison further to the problem of moral agency, asking given the Buddhist teaching that we should eliminate passions to attain peace of mind, and Humean picture of motivation, how we can be an ethical agent at all.

**Wong, Peter**

**On 'cultivation of the self' as the basis of realising the way—an exploration of the Great Learning**

The *Great Learning (Da Xue 《大學》)* offers a summary for the realisation of the Confucian project through a list of eight items which takes the cultivation of the self (*xiushen 修身*) as its basis. It outlines two branching paths with the self as their beginning, one leading to establishing peace in the world, the other to making appropriate the heart-mind by attending to one's intention, and to the things and events in one's environment. While the *Great Learning* seems to be aligned with the 'inner' path of cultivating the heart-mind of the Mencian tradition, its other branch of establishing peace in the world is also compatible with the teachings of Xunzi. This paper examines the possibility that the *Great Learning* offers a way to reconcile the 'inner' and 'outer' paths by requiring concessions from both Mencian and Xunzian positions.

**Zenk, Benjamin**

**Disagreement and Haribhadra’s Defense of Non-Absolutism**

If, in making peace between two logically conflicting and supposedly dogmatic views, a non-partisan philosopher attempts to argue that each view is correct, is this philosopher bound to a dogmatic syncretism? Haribhadra Yākinī-putra has a reputation for being philosophically non-partisan, and in his *Anekānta-jaya-patākā (Victory Banner of Non-Absolutism)* he attempts to make peace between logical opposites, thereby securing victory for what appears to be a partisan doctrine. This essay will examine the first section of that monograph, where Haribhadra responds to the objection that no object having both an existent and non-existent form can be established except by dogmatism. In doing so, it will also work through his defense of the Jaina doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekānta-vāda*), attempting to draw connections between the text's intricate conceptual arguments and the thinker's more general claims about tolerance of and deference to disagreeing views elsewhere.
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Gods, Heroes and Clowns: Performance and Narrative in South and Southeast Asian Art

Free entry  
NGV International  
Level 1 Mezzanine  
1 May 15 – 4 Oct 15  
Open 10am–5pm  
Closed Tuesday

Gods, Heroes and Clowns: Performance and Narrative in South and Southeast Asian Art explores visual and performance art inspired by the many narratives that pervade South and Southeast Asia, including the great Hindu epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, and ballads describing the exploits of local folk heroes. Works on display come from India, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia and Cambodia and include storyteller’s cloths, shrine and temple hangings, manuscripts and paintings, masks and puppets. Historical and contemporary works in this exhibition use narrative as a means of exploring emotions, morals, and responses to contemporary events.

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